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INTRODUCTION
“The securities markets are crucial to our economic performance
as a nation” because they are vital to the success of American private
and public sectors. 2 Both private companies and government entities
need capital to operate. One of the primary means of raising capital is
by issuing securities and selling them to investors. 3 While some
securities are traded nationally on exchanges, such as the New York
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), or through the National Association of
1

J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Bachelor of Science in Information Technology Management,
summa cum laude, December 2004, Christian Brothers University.
2
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 50 (1995); Factbox: What is the municipal bond
market?, REUTERS, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/
idUSTRE4BT34X20081230 (discussing securities issued in the public sector);
WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT
BOND MARKET: A HANDBOOK 3 (2001).
3
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, STOCKS, COMMODITIES AND THE MARKET,
http://usinfo.org/zhtw/DOCS/OutlineEconomy/chap5.html (last visited April 1,
2009). Consequently, “[i]f the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use
of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is
interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is
likely to be a ‘security.’” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990).
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Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system (“Nasdaq”), 4 other
securities are traded within limited groups of investors.
Similar to their nationally traded counterparts, non-publicly traded
securities range from traditional stocks, bonds, and notes, to more
complex instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities. 5 Stocks
give the purchaser voting rights and the right to dividends contingent
on the issuer's profits. 6 These instruments are freely transferable and
they typically appreciate over time. 7 Bonds and notes, on the other
hand, do not give investors voting rights or rights to dividends. 8
Rather, they evidence the issuer's promise to repay an extension of
credit. 9 Similar to stocks, these instruments are transferable, but their
value remains the same over time. 10
The statutory definition of securities includes a wide range of
financial instruments either because it mentions them expressly—such
as stock, bonds, and notes—or under the designation of an “investment
contract.” 11 An “investment contract” is a transaction where “a person
invests. . .money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” 12 Mortgage4

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 3. Stocks, Commodities and the Market,
http://usinfo.org/zhtw/DOCS/OutlineEconomy/chap5.html (last visited April 1,
2009).
5
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
6
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (citing United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686. Congress “recognized the
virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of ‘countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on
the promise of profits,’ SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946), and
determined that the best way to achieve its goal of protecting investors was ‘to
define “the term ‘security’ in sufficiently broad and general terms.”’” Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60–-61 (1990) (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 847–-848
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933))).
12
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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backed securities are “investment contracts” because investors buy
them to gain profits from the “efforts of others”—homeowners' efforts
of paying mortgages—thereby participating in a “common enterprise.”
The “common enterprise” involving mortgage-backed securities is
rather complex. At the core of this enterprise are individual
homeowners who borrow money from banks, mortgage companies,
and other mortgage loan originators and offer mortgages as security
for these loans. Lenders retain security interests in the homes until the
homeowners pay off the loan. 13 But in the meantime, the lenders sell
these mortgages to governmental or quasi-governmental entities, such
as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), as well as private
financial institutions, such as Countrywide Financial, Lehman
Brothers, and Wells Fargo. 14 Governmental and private entities then
assemble these mortgages into “mortgage pools” and issue securities
that represent claims on the homeowners' principal and interest
payments on their respective loans in the pool, thereby creating a
“common enterprise.” 15
When issuing mortgage-backed securities or other types of
securities, entities must comply with the Securities Act's obligations of
disclosure of material information in registration statements, written
prospectuses, or even oral communications concerning the sale of
securities. 16 To ensure compliance, the Securities Act backs the
detailed disclosure obligations by a range of sanctions, including a
private cause of action. Among such private actions sanctions are (1)
§ 11 of the Securities Act, which imposes liability for material
misrepresentation or omission in the registration statement; 17 (2)
13

See U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, June
25, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. For a detailed discussion on the Securities Act
requirements see ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 77-136 (Aspen Law
& Business 1998).
17
15 U.S.C. § 77k.
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§ 12(a)(2), which permit purchasers of securities to seek rescission if
the offering was carried out “by means of a prospectus or oral
communication” that is materially false or misleading; 18 and, finally
(3) § 15, which permits civil action against “control persons,” such as
majority shareholders, directors, or officers of a corporate issuer liable
under §§ 11 or 12 of the Securities Act. 19
Plaintiffs can bring a cause of action under the Securities Act in
federal or state court: both court systems have jurisdiction over claims
alleging violations of the Securities Act. 20 For more than sixty years
after the enactment of the Securities Act in 1933, plaintiffs were filing
securities claims in federal court. But, in 1995, Congress imposed
heighted requirements on class actions alleging violations of the
Securities Act if such claims were brought in federal court. 21 To avoid
having to comply with the heightened requirements, plaintiffs began
filing class actions based on the Securities Act in state courts. 22
In 2007, the trend of state court filings of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act culminated into a new type of
securities litigation: state court filings of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities in general and mortgage-backed securities in particular.
The number of lawsuits usually increases when the securities
market declines. 23 The market of mortgage-backed securities proved
to be no exception. Between 2001 and 2006, the volume of mortgagebacked securities issues exceeded $1 trillion dollars, peaking at more
than $2 trillion dollars in 2003. 24 But in 2007 and 2008, the “common
18

Id. at § 77l(a)(2); PALMITER, supra note 16, at 171.
15 U.S.C. § 77o.
20
Id. at § 77v(a).
21
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2005).
22
69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation § 887 (2008).
23
1320 PLI/CORP 265, 267 (2002) (citing Martha Neil, With the Market Fizzle,
a New Round of Securities Suits Take Aim At once High-Flying IPO's, 88 A.B.A.J.
49 (2002).
24
SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, ISSUANCE
OF AGENCY MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Dec. 31, 2006),
http://www.sifma.net/story.asp?id=297.
19
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enterprise” of mortgages suffered a setback when the growing number
homeowners were unable to pay principal or interest on their loans,
and their homes—securities for the loans—were decreasing in value.
Thus, seeking to recover losses on their mortgage-backed securities, 25
investors began filing in class actions alleging violations of the
Securities Act with respect to these non-publicly traded securities, and
increasingly doing so in state courts. 26
It became important for defendants to remove these claims to
federal court. A civil action is removable to a district court that has
subject matter jurisdiction over the case, unless another federal statute
bars such removal. 27 Federal courts have federal question and, in some
cases, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act. 28 But, it is unclear whether another
federal statute bars removal of class actions alleging violations of the
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. Section
22 of the Securities Act bars removal of claims arising under the
Securities Act. 29 But the removal provision of the Class Action
Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which Congress enacted in 2005, broadly
25

2008 Activity Is at Its Highest Level Since 2004, NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 6,
2009, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20090106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf; see
also Paul Karlsgodt, Troubled Economic Times Can Push the Market for Class
Actions. But Can You Afford to Take on These Cases? Suemagazine.com, available
at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20090106_YIR08_F
ull_Report.pdf. For a discussion on why plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state courts,
while defendants favor federal courts, see Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R.
Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference
Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593.
26
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at *10 (1998)
27
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
28
The Securities Act expressly grants federal courts jurisdiction over claims
arising under the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Additionally, a federal court
may have another basis for exercising jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(2).
29
The Securities Act provides a narrow exception to such removal bar, but that
exception does not apply to class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act
with respect to non-publicly traded securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 77p(c).
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permits removal of class actions. 30 Therefore the removal provisions
of the Securities Act and CAFA conflict. On the one hand, permitting
removal of a class action alleging violations of the Securities Act with
respect to non-publicly traded securities conflicts with the Securities
Act's prohibition on removal of claims arising under the Securities
Act. 31 But, on the other hand, prohibiting removal of such claim
appears to contradict CAFA, which generally permits removal of class
actions. 32
Given the growing number of state court filings of class actions
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally
traded securities in general and mortgage-backed-securities in
particular, 33 it is important to determine whether the Securities Act
bars removal of these claims. To provide a background for answering
this question, Part I of this article explains the general framework of
removal and the conflicting provisions of the Securities Act and the
Class Action Fairness Act. Next, Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Luther v. Countrywide that the Securities Act bars removal
of a class action alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect
to mortgage-backed securities. Part III analyzes the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Katz v. Gerardi, in which the court disagreed with Luther
and held that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions
that allege violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly
traded securities. Finally, Part IV analyzes and expands on the
reasoning of the Luther and Katz courts, concluding that the Seventh
30

The CAFA removal provision has some exceptions, none of which apply to
non-publicly traded securities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (removal provision);
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (exceptions to the removal provision).
31
See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
32
See 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
33
2008 Activity Is at Its Highest Level Since 2004, NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 6,
2009, Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20090106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf; see
also Paul Karlsgodt, Troubled Economic Times Can Push the Market for Class
Actions. But Can You Afford to Take on These Cases? Suemagazine.com, available
at http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Articles/
LITIGATION/Karlsgodt-Sue_Magazine_1-09.pdf.
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Circuit decided correctly that the Securities Act does not bar removal
of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to
non-publicly traded securities.
I.

BACKGROUND

To determine whether the Securities Act bars removal of class
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to nonpublicly traded securities, it is important to understand the removal
framework of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which governs removal of cases from
state to federal court, provides that “any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the Unites States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant. . .[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided by Act of Congress.” 34 Thus, to remove a class
action alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to nonpublicly traded securities, defendant must show that (1) the district
court has jurisdiction over such action; and (2) another statute does not
bar removal of the claim. 35
Federal courts have at least one, and, possibly, more, bases for
jurisdiction over class actions based on the Securities Act. Federal
question jurisdiction gives federal courts power to hear claims arising
under the “laws of the United States.” 36 The Securities Act is a federal
law. 37 Therefore, federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over
claims arising under the Securities Act. Additionally, the Securities Act
expressly gives federal (and state) courts jurisdiction over claims
arising under that statute. 38 Finally, class actions alleging violations of
the Securities Act may satisfy the diversity-of-citizenship requirements

34

28 U.S.C § 1441.
See id.
36
Id. at § 1441(b).
37
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
38
Id. at § 77v(a).
35
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of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), thereby providing
another basis for federal court jurisdiction of such cases.39
The issue of whether another federal statute bars removal of class
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to nonpublicly traded securities is more complex. To understand why this
question is complex, it is necessary to examine the removal provisions
of the Securities Act and the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA.”)
A. The Securities Act
The Securities Act generally prohibits removal of claims arising
under the Securities Act, although it does not specifically address class
actions. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act provides: “[e]xcept as
provided in section 77p(c) [of title 15], no case arising under. .
.subchapter [I] 40 and brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to an court of the United States.” 41
Section 77p(c)—that § 22(a) references as an exception to the
Securities Act's prohibition of removal—does not apply to class
actions arising under the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly
traded securities. 42 Section 77p(c) provides:
Any covered class action 43 brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection

39

CAFA expanded federal court jurisdiction over “any civil action in which
the matter in controversy exceeds. . .$5,000,000, and is a class action in which. .
.any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2).
40
Subchapter I of the Securities Act applies to all domestic securities, which
include non-publicly traded securities at issue in this article.
41
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added).
42
Id. at § 77p(c).
43
A “covered class action” is “any single lawsuit” or “any group of lawsuits
filed in. . .the same court and involving common questions of law or fact” that seeks
“damages on behalf of more than 50 persons.” 15 U.S.C § 77p(f)(2)(A).
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(b), 44 shall be removable to the Federal district court
for the district in which the action is pending, and shall
be subject to subsection (b). 45
For the purposes of § 77p(c), a “covered security” is a security
“listed. . .on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange, or. . .the Nasdaq Stock Market[, or]. . .a national securities
exchange.” 46 Because non-nationally traded securities are not listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
Nasdaq, or another national securities exchange, these securities are
not “covered securities.” 47 Thus, the exception under § 77p(c) to the
Securities Act's removal ban does not apply to class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act involving non-nationally traded
securities. 48 But the issue is whether § 22(a) bars removal of these
claims after the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, which
contains a removal provisions that generally permits removal of class
actions.
B. The Class Action Fairness Act
Unlike the removal provision of the Securities Act enacted in
1933, 49 the removal provision of the Class Action Fairness Act
44

BRIAN E. PASTUSZENSKI ET AL., STATE COURT SECURITIES CASES:
PREEMPTION AND STAYS OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE SECURITIES LITIGATION
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT, SJ084 ALI-ABA 825, 840 (2004) (explaining that the
statutory reference to subsection (b) has caused a number of circuit splits and
disagreements among federal district courts. The majority of the courts have
interpreted it to modify “covered class actions.” Therefore, to meet the requirements
of 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c), a covered class action must satisfy the requirements of
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), which, in turn, requirements that the claim be brought under
state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)).
45
15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
46
Id. at § 77r(b).
47
See id.
48
Id. at § 77p(c).
49
See id. at § 77v(a).
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(“CAFA”) enacted in 2005, addresses removal of class actions. 50
CAFA provides:
[I]n general[,]. . .[a] class action may be removed to a
district court of the United States in accordance with
section 1446. . .without regard to whether any
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is
brought, except that such action may be removed by
any defendant without the consent of all defendants. 51
Section 1446—that the CAFA removal provision references—
requires compliance with certain removal procedures. 52 For example,
to remove a civil action, a defendant must file in the district court a
notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 53 and promptly after doing so, the defendant must give
written notice of removal to the adverse parties and to the state court. 54
Although the CAFA removal provision contains exceptions, none
of them apply to class actions alleging violations of Securities Act
with respect to non-publicly traded securities. 55 Knowledge of these
exceptions, however, is helpful in interpreting whether the CAFA
removal provision “trumps” 56 the Securities Act's ban on removal. 28
U.S.C. § 1453(d) provides that the CAFA removal provision:
[S]hall not apply to any class action that solely
involves (1) a claim concerning a covered security. . .;
(2) a claim that relates to the internal affairs or
50

See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
Id. at § 1453(b); see JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 12:6 (2008).
52
28 U.S.C. § 1446.
53
Id. at § 1446(a).
54
Id. at § 1446(d).
55
See id. at § 1453(d).
56
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008).
51
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governance of a corporation. . .; or (3) a claim that
relates to the rights, duties. . ., and obligations relating
to. . .any security. 57
Class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect
to non-covered securities do not concern “internal affairs or
governance of a corporation;” they do not involve rights, duties, or
obligations relating to a security. Therefore, exceptions under §§
1453(d)(2) and (3) do not apply.
Although § 1453(d)(1) addresses securities, it indicates the CAFA
removal provision does not apply to claims involving “covered
securities;” it is silent with regard to non-publicly traded securities,
which are not “covered securities.” 58 CAFA's silence with respect to
non-covered securities raises several questions. Therefore, the issue is
whether the Securities Act bars removal of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities even though the CAFA removal provision generally permits
removal of class actions. The Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuits
have answered this question differently.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE SECURITIES ACT BARS
REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE
SECURITIES ACT WITH RESPECT TO NON-PUBLICLY TRADED SECURITIES
To determine whether the Securities Act bars removal of class
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to nonpublicly traded securities, it is helpful to consider how courts have
resolved the conflict between the removal provisions of CAFA and the
Securities Act. The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court
to consider this "novel set of removal issues under the securities
law." 59

57

28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (emphasis added).
See id. at § 1453.
59
Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *4.
58
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A. Fact and Procedural History of Luther v. Countrywide
On November 14, 2007, David H. Luther filed a class action
complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Countrywide
Home Loans Servicing LP, CWALT, Inc. (“CWALT”), a subsidiary of
Countrywide Financial Corporation, several other affiliates and
subsidiaries of Countrywide Financial Corporation, multiple
alternative loan trusts, and various underwriters. 60 At the heart of the
lawsuit was a type of mortgage-backed securities, pass-through
certificates, 61 which CWALT had issued. 62 Between January 2005 and
January 2007, Luther had acquired, together with other persons and
entities on behalf of which he was suing, hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of these securities. 63 From the vantage point of 2007,
plaintiff argued that “the risk of the investments was much greater than
represented by the registration statements and prospectus supplements
[for the mortgage-backed securities], which omitted and misstated the
credit worthiness of the underlying mortgage borrowers.” 64 Thus,
according to Luther, the registration statements and prospectus
supplements for the mortgage pass-through certificates were false and
misleading. 65 Because “the value of the certificates ha[d] substantially
declined [after] many of the underlying mortgage loans became

60

Id. at *1. For the definition of an underwriter see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).
Pass-through certificates are a basic type of mortgage-backed security that
entitles the holder to a pro-rate share of all principal and interest payments made on
the pool of loan assets. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed
Securities, SEC.GOV, June 25, 2007,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
62
Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *1.
63
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2008).
64
Id. at 1033.
65
Id.
61
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uncollectible,” 66 Luther was seeking damages under §§ 11, 67
12(a)(2), 68 and 15 69 of the Securities Act. 70
On December 14, 2007, the defendants removed Luther's class
action federal court pursuant to several statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),
the statute governing removal generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a provision
that sets out removal procedures, and, implicitly, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, the
CAFA removal provision that requires compliance with the abovementioned 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 71 Defendants based removal jurisdiction
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by CAFA. 72
Luther filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, arguing
that CAFA did not apply. 73
B. Decision of the District Court
On February 28, 2008, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted the plaintiff's motion to remand
the case to state court. 74 The court held that the prohibition on removal
in the Securities Act “trumps” the general removal provision in
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 75 for two reasons. 76 First, “[n]one of the[]
concerns” behind the enactment of CAFA resonate in the Securities
Act cases. 77 But the only Congressional concern the court discussed
66

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77k.
68
Id. at § 77l(a)(2).
69
Id. at § 77o.
70
Luther, 553 F.3d at 1033.
71
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at *1, *11–*12.
75
28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
court[]. . .ha[s]. . .jurisdiction, may be removed.”
76
Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *1, *8.
77
Id. at *8.
67
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was that of "'mak[ing] it harder for plaintiffs[]. . .to 'game the system'
by trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction.'" 78 Before the adoption of
CAFA, for a district court to have jurisdiction over a class action, the
amount in controversy had to be $75,000—which was not an issue in
most claims—and complete diversity of citizenship among all
plaintiffs and defendants, which was considerably more difficult to
achieve in cases involving a multitude of parties. 79 The "'gam[ing] [of]
the system'" or "artful pleading," occurred by adding parties solely
based on their State of citizenship or alleging an amount in
controversy that did not trigger the $75,000 threshold. 80 Congress was
concerned with the "artful pleading" that plaintiffs used to manipulate
the system. 81
By enacting CAFA, Congress sought to remedy "'a technical
glitch'" in the diversity jurisdiction statute, because of which class
action cases were usually excluded from federal court. 82 With regard
to this Congressional purpose, the court noted, correctly, "regardless of
the diversity of the parties or the amount sought, concurrent
jurisdiction was always present. . .so long as the case was brought
under the Securities Act." 83 Therefore, the court concluded that "the
apparent motivation[] for the enactment of CAFA [] was largely
irrelevant. . .in [Securities] Act cases." 84
Next, the court turned to the "basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific
subject [was] not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum." 85 Under such canon, "[w]here there [was] no
78

Id. at *6 (citing S. Rep. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). See Luther, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd)).
80
Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (citing 151 CONG. REC.
S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd)).
81
Id. at *7.
82
Id. at *7 (quoting 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7).
83
Id. at *8.
84
Id.
85
Id. at *9.
79
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clear intention otherwise, a specific statute [is] not. . .controlled or
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." 86
In Luther, the defendants "argu[ed] that an affirmative expression of
[Congress's] intent to make [Securities Act claims] removable. . .was
its failure to create a discrete exception that would preserve nonremovability of [the Securities] Act claims." 87 Although this argument
was ultimately "unavailing," 88 it created doubt in the mind of the court
with respect to removal of the case. 89 But because the court
"continue[d] to harbor significant doubt that CAFA provide[d] removal
jurisdiction in the fact of the [Securities] Act's absolute prohibition on
removal," 90 it remanded the case to state court.91
Generally, a district court's order remanding a removed case back
to state court is not appealable. 92 But a permission to appeal can be
sought and granted in certain cases." 93 In Luther, the defendants
sought, 94 and the Ninth Circuit granted, such permission to appeal the
district court's remand order. 95

86

Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
Id. (citing Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Remand at 19, Luther, No.
2:07-CV-08165-MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534 (C.D. Cal Feb 28,
2008)).
88
Id.
89
Id. at *10 (noting that “federal jurisdiction ‘[had to be] rejected if there [was]
any doubt as to the right of removal.’” (emphasis added)).
90
Id.
91
Id. at *12. Because the court concluded that CAFA conflicted with the nonremoval provision of the Securities Act, it declined to address the applicability of
CAFA's exceptions to the complaint at bar. Id. at *10.
92
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(d), 1453(c)(2)).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1033.
95
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2)).
87

470
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

C. Decision of the Ninth Circuit
After de novo review, 96 on July 16, 2008, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court. 97 Similar to the lower court,
the Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the legislative purpose behind the
adoption of CAFA. 98 It noted that Congress enacted CAFA, in part, to
"'restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction.'" 99 But the court did not
discuss whether its holding that the Securities Act prohibited removal
of the class at bar advanced such legislative purpose, which it did
not. 100
The court then turned to the "basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum." 101 The court found that the removal provision
of the Securities Act was "the more specific statute" because it
"applie[d] to the narrow subject of securities cases." 102 CAFA, "on the
other hand, appli[ed] to a 'generalized spectrum' of class actions."
Without explaining how the court identified the more specific of the
two statutes, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "narrow, precise, and
specific. . .[Securities Act] [was] not submerged by later enacted
[CAFA]." 103
Earlier in the decision, the court noted that "[i]n general, removal
statutes are strictly construed against removal. . .and any doubt is

96

Id.
Id. at 1033–34.
98
Id. at 1034.
99
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-2).
100
Id. at 1033–34.
101
Id. at 1034 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co, 426 U.S. 148, 153
(1976)).
102
Id.
103
Id.
97
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resolved against removability." 104 But the court did not make clear
whether it applied this doubt-resolving canon to conclude that "by
virtue of. . .the Securities Act,. . .Luther's state court class action
alleging only violations of the Securities Act. . .was not removable." 105
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE SECURITIES ACT DOES
NOT BAR REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE
SECURITIES ACT WITH RESPECT TO NON-PUBLICLY TRADED SECURITIES
In Katz v. Gerardi, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Luther
court 106 and the district court, 107 which had adopted the reasoning of
Luther. 108 Because the court's holding conflicted with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Luther, 109 Judge Easterbrook's opinion was
circulated before release to all judges in active service; none of the
judges favored a hearing en banc. 110
A. Facts and Procedural History
The case began on May 9, 2008, when Jack P. Katz ("Katz") filed
a class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect non-publicly
traded securities. 111 The nature of the securities at issue is relative
complex. Originally, Katz and other class members had contributed
real estate (or interests in real estate) to the Archstone-Smith Operating
104

Id. (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09
(1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1033–34.
107
Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4–*5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 23, 2008) (citing Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV08165-MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2008)).
108
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
109
Luther, 533 F.3d at 1033-34.
110
Katz, 552 F.3d at 562.
111
Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *1.
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Trust or its predecessor, Charles E. Smith Residential Realty L.P. 112 In
exchange, they received limited partnership interests in the ArchstoneSmith Operating Trust. 113 The general partner in the Archstone-Smith
Operating Trust was the Archstone-Smith Trust, both a publicly traded
corporation and a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT.") 114
By having a REIT as a general partner, limited partnerships, such
as the Archstone-Smith Operating Trust, gain the status of an Umbrella
Real Estate Investment Trust ("UPREIT"). 115 Archstone REIT, like the
Archstone UPREIT, "engaged primarily in the acquisition,
development, redevelopment, operations and long-term ownership of
apartment communities in the United States." 116 Together, they
"owned or had an ownership position in 348 communities,
representing 88,011 [apartments]." 117
By contributing real estate to the Archstone UPREIT as opposed
to the Archstone REIT, plaintiffs not only received limited partnership
interests in the entity, but also gained significant tax and liquidity
advantages. 118 Contributions of property to a REIT are taxable in the
amount equal to the excess of the value of the stock received over the
basis of the property contributed. 119 By contributing real estate to the
Archstone UPREIT, plaintiffs received tax-deferred treatment of the
transactions, avoiding tax liability. 120 They also enjoyed liquidity of
their limited partnership interests. Although A-1 Units were not traded
publicly, plaintiffs could convert them into the common stock of

112

Id.
Id.
114
Complaint ¶ 45, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 9, 2008).
115
Id. at ¶ 40.
116
Id. at ¶ 46.
117
Id. at ¶ 46.
118
Id. at ¶ 49.
119
Id. at ¶¶ 21, 39.
120
Id. at ¶ 7.
113
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Archstone REIT, which was publicly traded on the New York Stock
exchange. 121
Katz argued that the holders of A-1 Units lost both tax and
liquidity advantages because of a subsequent merger between the
Archstone UPRET and the Archstone REIT with the Tishman-Lehman
Partnership, a partnership sponsored by Tishman Speyer and Lehman
Brothers Holdings. 122 The merger led to the registration and issuance
of new securities, Series O Preferred Units. 123 Holders of the old
securities could exchange their A-1 Units for Series O Preferred Units
or sell them for cash. 124 Katz chose the latter option. 125 But he argued
that by accepting the cash offer, he lost the tax benefits he had
expected when contributing real estate to the Archstone UPREIT and,
together with other A-1 Unit holders, incurred capital gains that had
"resulted in millions of dollars of tax" liability. 126 Further, Katz argued
that if the holders had converted their A-1 units into Series O Preferred
Units, they would have forfeited their liquidity advantages because
Series O units were not going to be publicly traded for at least five
years after the merger. 127
Thus, Katz filed a class action lawsuit against the Archstone
UPREIT, Archstone REIT, the directors and trustees of Archstone
REIT, as well as Tishman Speyer and Lehman Brothers Holdings
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to the Series O
Preferred Units, which were, at least initially, non-publicly traded
securities. According to the plaintiff, "the Prospectus and Registration
statement issued pursuant to the merger agreement contained false and

121

Id. at ¶ 47.
Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 59, 75.
123
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
124
Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8, 67, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 9, 2008).
125
Id. at ¶ 7.
126
Id.
127
Id. at ¶ 8.
122
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misleading information about the merger." 128 Additionally, the
transactions "resulting in the A-1 unit holders exchanging their A-1
units for cash and/or new securities were solicited through false and
misleading prospectuses and the securities were issued by way of a
materially false and misleading registration statement." 129 Thus,
plaintiff based his claims on §§ 11, 130 12(a)(2), 131 and 15 132 of the
Securities. 133
On July 16, 2008, defendant removed Katz's class action to
federal court, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. 134 A few days later, on July 23, 2008, Katz filed a motion to
remand the case to state court. 135
B. Decision of the District Court
On September 23, 2008, the United States District Court granted
the motion to remand the case to state court. 136 First, the court
considered whether the Securities Act applied to the case at bar. 137 The
defendants argued it did not because even though Katz "ha[d] cast his
claims as arising under the [Securities] Act, he [did] not have a viable
claim under the [statute.]" 138 To maintain a claim under the Securities
128

Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 23, 2008).
129
Complaint ¶ 10, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 9, 2008).
130
15 U.S.C. § 77k.
131
Id. at § 77l(a)(2).
132
Id. at § 77o.
133
Complaint ¶ 11, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 9, 2008).
134
Notice of Removal, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815
(July 16, 2008).
135
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035,
2008 WL 4376815 (July 23, 2008).
136
Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *5.
137
Id. at *3–*4.
138
Id. at *3 n.3.

475
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/8

20

Aronchik: A Fair Share (of Removal): Resolving a Conflict Between the Class

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

Act, "[a person] must be a purchaser or acquiror of securities." 139
Because Katz received cash for his A-1 units, defendants argued, he
"neither 'acquired' nor 'purchased a 'security' as required in those
provisions. 140 Katz disagreed, arguing that he was a purchaser of
securities because "his A-1 shares were effectively changed by the
merger into A-1 Units with inferior economic rights." 141 Although the
court “[did] not. . .find Katz's argument factually persuasive," it
concluded that the "the state court [was] the proper forum for the
alleged claims to be determined. . .even if. . .Katz alleged. . .claims
under the [Securities] Act to avoid removal under [the Securities
Act].” 142
The court's conclusion that the state court was the proper forum
for the securities class action at bar was based on Luther. 143 The court
found persuasive the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the canon of statutory
construction favoring specific statutes over general statutes. 144 Thus,
like the Luther court, the district court concluded that “Section 22(a),
the more specific statute governing securities actions, control[led] this
situation, not the CAFA, which generally governs large class
actions.” 145 Accordingly, the court remanded the class action to state
court. 146
On October 6, 2008, the defendants filed a petition for permission
to appeal pursuant to CAFA, 147 and the Seventh Circuit granted their
petition. 148
139

Id. at *3.
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at *4.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at *5.
147
Petition for Permission to Appeal, Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558 (Oct. 6,
2008). CAFA provides for discretionary appellate review of district court orders
granting or denying motions for remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)
148
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
140
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C. Seventh Circuit's Decision
On January 5, 2009, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's order to remand Katz's class action. 149 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff can
foreclose removal simply by invoking the Securities Act.150 Writing
for the panel, Judge Easterbrook noted that "it cannot be right to say
that a pleader's choice of language always defeats removal." 151 As
defendants pointed out, “ [o]nly purchasers of securities may pursue
[private] actions under the [Securities] Act.” 152 Because “Katz (and
other members of his class) sold securities for cash. . .he did not buy
any new security.” 153 Thus, Katz did not necessarily have a private
right of action under the Securities Act. 154 But the Seventh Circuit
then concluded “it [was] possible for a private party to suffer an injury
covered by the securities laws even though there is no private right of
action.” 155
Because “it was best to assume that Katz's complaint [was] not
just artful pleading,” the court considered whether the Securities Act
“insulated” all claims under the Securities Act from removal under
CAFA. 156 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that CAFA and the
Securities Act were “incompatible; one or the other had to yield.” 157
To determine which of the statutes had to yield, the court turned to the
149

Id. at 563.
Id. at 560. The court was responding to the district court's statement that
“the state court [was] the proper forum for the alleged claims to be determined. .
.even if. . .Katz alleged. . .claims under the [Securities] Act to avoid removal under
[the Securities Act].” Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4.
151
Katz, 552 F.3d at 560.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See id. at 561.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
150
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canons of statutory construction. 158 Among such canons is the
principle that “the older law yields to the newer.” 159 But “Luther [held]
that things are otherwise for [the Securities Act] because. . .an older
law maintains its vitality when it is more specific than a newer
one.” 160
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that “canon favoring
preservation of specific statutes arguably affected by newer, more
general statutes works [only] when one statute is a subset of the
other.” 161 But—as Luther “failed to recognize”—the Securities Act
was not a subset of CAFA. 162 Therefore, the court could not apply the
canon favoring the specific law over general because it could not
determine whether the Securities Act is more specific or more general
than CAFA. 163 The removal provision of the Securities Act “covers
only securities actions, but it includes. . .single-investor suits as well
as class actions[;]. . .[CAFA], by contrast, covers only large, multistate class actions." Therefore, there [was] no answer to. . .a question
[of whether] the [Securities] Act was more specific because it dealt
only with securities law, or CAFA was more specific because it dealt
only nationwide class actions.” 164
Even though the canon did not aid the court's statutory
interpretation, the language of CAFA “told” the court how the new
removal rule applied to securities actions. Section § 1453(b) provides:
[I]n general[,]. . .[a] class action may be removed to a
district court of the United States. . .without regard to
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which
the action is brought, except that such action may be

158

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
160
Id. (emphasis added).
161
Id. at 561–62.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Katz, 552 F.3d at 561-62.Id.
159
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removed by any defendant without the consent of all
defendants. 165
Thus, the court concluded that § 1453(b) “allows removal of any class
action brought within federal jurisdiction.” 166 Next, the court analyzed
§ 1453(d), which contains the list of exceptions to applicability of the
CAFA removal provision:
This section shall not apply to any class action that
solely involves (1) a claim concerning a covered
security. . .; (2) a claim that relates to the internal
affairs or governance of a corporation. . .; or (3) a
claim that relates to the rights, duties. . ., and
obligations relating to. . .any security. 167
According to the Seventh Circuit, “claims listed in this list are not
removable. Other securities class actions are removable if they meet
CAFA requirements.” 168 To read § 22(a) as barring removal of a class
action not involving a claim listed in § 1453(d), as plaintiff suggests,
“would be to make most of § 1453(d) pointless.” 169 Because § 1453(d)
“left no doubt about how the [Securities] Act. . .and CAFA fit
together,” the court found no reason to use doubt-resolving canons of
statutory construction. 170
Although the Seventh Circuit had “no doubt” that the Securities
Act did not bar removal of class actions alleging violations of the
Securities with respect to non-covered securities, the court noted that
“there was some incongruity in removing a securities action under

165

28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 12:6 (2008).
166
Katz, 552 F.3d at 562 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).
167
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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[CAFA].” 171 The “incongruity” arose from the fact CAFA created a
“species of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction,” but it permitted
removal of claims—such as class actions alleging violations of the
Securities Act—over which federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction. 172 Despite such “incongruity,” the court concluded, “both
the principal [CAFA] removal rule and [its] exceptions show[ed] that
[CAFA] applies to claims that arise under federal law (provided that
minimal diversity is present).” 173
Finally, the court considered whether § 1453(d) exceptions
prevented removal of Katz's class action. 174 First, the court concluded
that the A-1 Unites in Archstone were not “covered securities” because
they did not trade nationally; therefore, § 1453(d)(1) exception did not
apply. 175 Second, Katz did not characterize his claim as dealing with
corporate internal affairs; therefore, § 1453(d)(2) did not apply. 176
Finally, § 1453(d)(3) exempts from operation of CAFA claims relating
“to the rights, duties. . ., and obligations relating to. . .any security.” 177
The parties disagreed as to whether § 1453(d)(3) applied, and the court
remanded the case to the district court for a hearing at which the
parties could “elaborate on their positions.”178 The Seventh Circuit
noted that unless § 1453(d)(3) prevented removal under CAFA, the
defendants removal of Katz's class action alleging violations of the
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities was
proper under CAFA, and the district court had to decide the case on its
merits. 179

171

Id.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 562–63.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 563.
179
Id.
172
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IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT RESOLVES CORRECTLY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
REMOVAL PROVISION OF CAFA AND THE SECURITIES ACT
In Katz v. Gerardi, 180 the Seventh Circuit decided correctly that
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
“[t]he starting point for interpretation of a statute ‘is the language of
the statute itself.’” 181 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was correct to both
analyze the language of the CAFA removal provision and to criticize
Luther for failing to “analyze this language or even acknowledge its
existence.” 182
But, when interpreting the statute, the duty of the court is to “find
[an] interpretation [that] can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the
statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and
with the general purposes that Congress manifested.” 183 Accordingly,
courts consider the legislative history of the statute to clarify or
confirm understanding of the statutory language. 184 When determining
whether the Securities Act bars removal of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
180

Id.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835
(1990) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
182
Katz, 552 F.3d at 562.
183
C.I.R. v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (citing NLRB v. Lion Oil Co.,
352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added)).
184
See e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (noting
that “words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if
reasonably possible to effectuate intent of lawmakers and meaning in particular
instances is to be arrived at not only by consideration of words themselves but by
considering context [and] purposes of law”); United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837,
841 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the plain language of the statute is the starting
point for statutory interpretation, but that the structure and language of the statute as
a whole can aid in interpreting the plain meaning and that legislative history can be
looked to if the statutory language is unclear).
181
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securities, neither Katz nor Luther considered adequately the
legislative history of CAFA and the Securities Act. The Seventh
Circuit was silent on CAFA's legislative purpose. The district court
and the Ninth Circuit in Luther appeared to recognize the importance
of legislative history. 185 But their analysis of Congress's purposes for
the enactment of CAFA was incomplete: the courts discussed only the
reasons for expansion of federal court jurisdiction over class actions,
not the purposes behind the CAFA removal provision. 186
An in-depth look at the legislative purpose behind the enactment
of the CAFA removal provision reveals that it is best served by
holding—as the Seventh Circuit did in Katz v. Gerardi 187 —that the
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations
of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities.
Luther's approach of applying the Securities Act's removal bar to such
claims, on the other hand, impedes Congress's goals. Additionally,
nothing in the legislative history of the Securities Act evidences a
Congressional intent to prohibit removal of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities. Therefore, the appropriate way to resolve the conflict
between the removal provisions of CAFA and the Securities Act is to
hold that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally
traded securities; thus, such claims are removable if they otherwise
meet CAFA removal requirements.
A. Legislative History of CAFA
CAFA's legislative history supports the conclusion that the
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations
of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities.
185

Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2008); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *7–*8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008).
186
Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034; Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *7–*8.
187
Katz, 552 F.3d at 563.
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In Luther, the district court indicated that Congress enacted CAFA, in
part, to “make it harder for plaintiffs to. . .defeat diversity jurisdiction”
in class actions. 188 But as the court correctly noted, even before the
enactment of CAFA, federal courts had jurisdiction over cases arising
under the Securities Act. 189 Because the Securities Act is a federal
statute, claims arising under the Securities Act fall within federal
question jurisdiction of the district courts. 190 Therefore, CAFA's
expansion of federal court diversity jurisdiction over class actions is
“irrelevant” to securities class actions. 191
But when enacting the CAFA removal provision, Congress sought
to only expand federal courts' jurisdiction over class actions, but also
to ensure that class actions were litigated in federal court. Congress
articulated three reasons why federal courts, not state courts, should
hear these cases: (1) federal courts help protect federal interest in
interstate commerce; (2) federal courts ensure compliance with
appropriate litigation procedures; and (3) federal courts help avoid
duplicative litigation. 192 These legislative goals apply to class actions
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly
traded securities. Therefore, they are best served by holding that the
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations
of the Securities Act. On the other hand, if courts interpret the
Securities Act as barring removal of class actions involving securities,
these claims, unlike other class actions, cannot be litigated in federal
court, thereby impeding Congress's goals.
1. Protecting Federal Interest in Interstate Commerce
The Unites States Supreme Court has recognized that federal
court is the appropriate forum for cases that have ramifications for
188

Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6.
Id. at *8.
190
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
191
Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *8.
192
Julia B. Strickland et al., 2007 Overview of the Class Action Fairness Act,
761 PLI/Lit 11, at *15–*16 (2007).
189
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interstate commerce: the Court has “frequently had occasion to show. . .
the existence of federal supervision over interstate commerce, and the
consequent obligation upon the federal courts to protect that right of
control from encroachment on the part of the states.” 193 Congress
believed that class actions have “significant implications for the
national economy.” 194 As the Ninth Circuit noted—but seemed to
ignore when remanding Luther's claim to state court—Congress
enacted CAFA, in part, to “‘restore the intent of the framers of the
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction.’” 195 Congress understood that class actions
“usually involve large amounts of money and many plaintiffs.” 196
Further, there is a “growing trend. . .to bring huge class actions on
behalf of hundreds of thousands or even millions of [plaintiffs].” 197
Therefore, Congress concluded that “the federal courts are the
appropriate forums to decide most interstate class actions.” 198
These concerns resonate with class actions alleging violations of
the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities.
First, these cases have significant ramifications for interstate
commerce. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“private securities litigation [is] an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses.” 199 Recent state court
filings of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with
respect to non-publicly traded securities “involve large amounts of
money and many plaintiffs.” Katz v. Gerardi involved “hundreds, if

193

New York, L E & W R Co v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431, 437

(1895).
194

S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 11 (2005).
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing Pub. L. No. 109-2).
196
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27(2005).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
195
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not thousands of similarly situated A-1 Unit holders” 200 seeking, at
minimum, “rescissory damages for their exchange[s]” of A-1 Units for
$60.75 each. 201 In Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension
Fund, a class action filed in state court and alleging violations of the
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities, “plaintiff
believe[d] that there [were] thousands members in the proposed
Class,” 202 all seeking rescissory damages. 203 Thus, class actions
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly
have significant ramifications for interstate commerce and, therefore,
fall within the category of cases that Congress intended for federal, not
state courts, to hear. Therefore, the Congress's goal of protecting the
federal interest in interstate commerce is best served by holding that
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities.
2. Ensuring Compliance with Proper Litigation Procedures
Another reason for the enactment of the CAFA removal provision
was to “minimize the class action abuses taking place in state
courts.” 204 More specifically, Congress noted that federal court judges
“were [more] careful than [some of] their state court counterparts
about applying the procedural requirements that govern class
actions.” 205 Thus, Congress enacted CAFA to remedy state courts'

200

Complaint ¶ 89, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County, Ill. May 9, 2008).
201
Complaint ¶ 113, Katz, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County May 9,
2008).
202
Complaint ¶ 26, Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, No. 08-0544BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008).
203
Complaint at ¶¶ 27–28, Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, No. 080544-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008).
204
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005).
205
Id. at 14.
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“often inadequate supervision over [class action] litigation
procedures.” 206
There are two levels of concern with respect to litigation
procedures for class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act
with respect to non-publicly traded securities First, because of the
large number of parties, which, oftentimes are citizens of different
states, state courts understandably may have difficulty ensuring
“inadequate supervision over litigation procedures” in these cases. 207
The second concern with respect to litigation procedures in
securities class actions is that state courts do not have power to enforce
heightened procedural requirements that Congress enacted in 1995
specifically for securities class actions. 208 That year, Congress found
that plaintiffs had been abusing the Securities Act to bring meritless
claims “to harass and cajole settlements out of businesses that had
done nothing wrong.” 209 Therefore, existing litigation procedures—
even if adequately supervised—were insufficient to thwart plaintiffs'
abuse of securities class actions. 210
To remedy the problem, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), creating new procedures for
“private action arising under [the Securities Act] brought as a plaintiff
class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 211 The
PSLRA imposed heightened procedural requirements for many aspects
of securities class action litigation, including certification of a class
representative, 212 appointment of lead plaintiff, 213 notices to plaintiffs,
206

S. REP. NO. 109-14,Id. at 4 (2005).
Complaint ¶¶ 12–33, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County May 9, 2008).
208
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1.
209
STATE COURT SECURITIES CASES: PREEMPTION AND STAYS OF DISCOVERY
UNDER THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 830 (Am. Law Inst.
2004).
210
Id.
211
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (emphasis added); see 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6831.50 (2008).
212
15 U.S.C § 77z-1(a)(2).
213
Id. at § 77z-1(a)(3).
207
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recovery by plaintiffs, 214 discovery rules, 215 sanctions for abusive
litigation, 216 and defendant's right to written interrogatories. 217 To
prevent abuses of the securities class action scheme, Congress raised
the standard for adequacy threshold for class representatives in
securities fraud class litigation and required certification by each
named plaintiff of knowledge of and accuracy of the complaint. 218
Further, the PSLRA dictated that “all discovery. . .be stayed during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss.” 219 It also required that notice to
class members of a proposed settlement specify the average amount of
damages per share and the attorney fee award sought, and in some
cases, even limited plaintiff's recovery to his or her pro rate share. 220
Because the PSLRA applies only to claims filed “pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 221 state courts do not have power to
enforce these requirements. But if class actions alleging violations of
the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities are
removable to federal court, class action plaintiffs would have to
comply with these heightened standards. Therefore, by holding that
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities—the Seventh Circuit's holding in Katz 222 —would further
Congress's goal of preventing abusive securities class actions.
Additionally, it would further Congress's purpose behind the
enactment of CAFA: inadequate supervision of other litigation
procedures with respect to class actions. On the other hand, a holding

214

Id. at § 77z-1(a)(4).
Id. at § 77z-1(b).
216
Id. at § 77z-1(c).
217
Id. at § 77z-1(d).
218
Id. at § 77z-1(a)(2).
219
Id. at § 77z-1(b)(1).
220
14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 6866.10 (2008).
221
15 U.S.C § 77z-1.
222
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
215
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to the contrary—like the Ninth Circuit's holding in Luther 223 —would
impede both Congressional goals.
3. Avoiding Duplicate Claims
Finally, by enacting the CAFA removal provision, Congress
sought to prevent plaintiffs from filing duplicative claims. These
filings of “expensive and predatory copy-cat cases” were possible
because state courts do not have a mechanism to consolidate these
cases. 224 Therefore, plaintiffs could “force defendants to litigate the
same case in multiple jurisdictions, driving up consumer costs.” 225 But
2005—the time of the enactment of CAFA—was not the first time
Congress expressed concern with the filing of parallel claims.
Seven years earlier, Congress acknowledged that the filing of
parallel securities class actions became an issue in private securities
litigation after the enactment of the PSLRA. 226 The PSLRA, among
other things, imposed a discovery stay during pending motions to
dismiss. 227 To avoid such a federal discovery stay, plaintiffs pursued
initial stages of litigation in state courts. 228 In 1998, Congress
attempted to curb the filing of parallel class actions claims alleging
223

Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2008).
224
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15 (2005).
225
Id.
226
Gareth T. Evans, The 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA) and Discovery in Parallel State Court Actions, PLI § 4:6.1 (2006); H.R.
REP. NO. 105-640, at *10–*11 (1998).
227
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b).
228
Ten Things We Know & Ten Things We Don't Know About the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1997) (joint
written testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino). Although there
could be unrelated reasons for plaintiffs to seek state courts, commentators have
largely discounted those. A Census of Securities Class Action Litigation After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm.
on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1997)
(written testimony of Michael A. Perino).
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violations of the Securities Act by enacting the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”), an exception to the Securities
Act's removal ban for claims arising under the Securities Act. But
because of the narrow scope of the SLUSA exception—which some
commentators have suggested was a “drafting blunder” 229 —plaintiff
continued filing parallel claims. In Katz, for example, plaintiffs filed
claims in both the Circuit Court of Cook County, an Illinois state
court, and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado,
a federal court. 230 In fact, in Katz, plaintiff “candidly admit[ted]. .
.that. . .a nearly-identical [suit]. . .filed on behalf of the same putative
plaintiff class against the same defendants and based on the same
facts. . .ha[d] been pending for months. . .[in the] District of
Colorado.” 231
The fact that Congress voiced concern over duplicative filing of
class actions again in 2005 demonstrates that it remained unsatisfied
with SLUSA's failure to remedy the problem with respect to securities
class actions. To advance Congress's goal courts should hold that the
Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging violations
of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. A
holding to the contrary would inhibit the goal that Congress has
repeatedly stated it wanted to achieve. Accordingly, not only the
language, but also the legislative history of CAFA supports the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the Securities Act does not bar
removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with
respect to non-publicly traded securities.
B. The Securities Act Did Not Contemplate Class Actions
Holding that the Securities act does not bar removal of class
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act is not inconsistent with
229

Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities Litigation – Up Close and Personal (pt.
2), 31 No. 2 Securities and Federal Corporate Law Report 1 (2009).
230
Stender v. Gerardi, No. 1:07-cv-02503-EWN-MJW (D. Colo. filed Dec. 30,
2007).
231
Reply in Support of Motion to Transfer at 1, Katz v. Gerardi, No.
08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Aug. 6, 2008).
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the Securities Act. Congress enacted the Securities Act's removal ban
in 1933, at the time when the class actions did not yet exist. The
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule governing federal court class
actions 232 was adopted in 1938. 233 But, even after the adoption of that
rule, class action lawsuits were serving primarily as tools for civil
rights litigants seeking injunctions in discrimination cases. 234
Although in the 1980s, class actions expanded to mass torts, 235 the
concept of securities class actions "that are a familiar part of today's
legal landscape [of securities law] did not arise until 1996. 236 At that
time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was "substantially amended
to expand the availability of the device." 237 Thus, as the history of
class actions indicates, Congress could not have intended to prohibit
removal of securities class actions when enacting the removal
provision of the Securities Act. Accordingly, holding that the
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations
of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities is
not inconsistent with the Securities Act.
CONCLUSION
In Katz v. Gerardi, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities. 238 Therefore, defendants can remove class actions alleging
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded
securities on the basis of the general removal provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441, and the CAFA removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).

232

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 6 (2005).
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
233
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Further, for a removal under CAFA to be proper, defendants must
comply with the removal procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 239
Permitting removal of class actions alleging violations of the
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities, such as
mortgage-backed securities, is consistent with the language and the
legislative history of the Class Action Fairness Act. Further, providing
a federal forum for these claims advances important public policy
goals. It strikes the appropriate balance between ensuring that (1)
“defrauded investors [can] recover their losses” from purchases of
non-publicly traded securities where issuers violated the Securities
Act; (2) both plaintiffs and defendants follow appropriate litigation
procedures; (3) defendants do not suffer an unfair burden by having to
defend duplicative litigation in several courts; and (4) the federal
interest in interstate commerce is protected by having the federal court
hear these claims. In sum, holding that the Securities Act does not bar
removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with
respect to non-publicly traded securities helps create a “fair [nonpublicly traded] share.”

239

See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
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